Thesis ledger
Dated forecasts and market interpretations with assessment criteria and subsequent outcomes. This records research, not portfolio performance.
Publication range: 2 Jul 2026 – 5 Nov 2026. Source: Hawk Thorne research record. Thesis descriptions retain the content recorded in the ledger.
Forecasts
25Claims about future events, assessed against a stated condition and time horizon.
- Held
- 14
- Broke
- 9
- Unresolved
- 0
- Awaiting assessment
- 2
Interpretations
134Assessments of current conditions. New evidence can sustain, revise or retire an interpretation. These do not contribute to forecast accuracy.
- Sustained
- 12
- Revised
- 26
- Retired
- 14
- Awaiting assessment
- 53
- Historical assessments
- 29
Assessment rules and forecast calibration
Since 27 July 2026, forecasts and interpretations follow separate assessment rules. Earlier interpretations graded against price thresholds remain in the history and are excluded from calibration.
Declared probabilities compared with assessed outcomes. Brier is the mean squared error; a lower score indicates less error within this sample. A small sample does not establish future forecasting accuracy.
Forecast calibration
scored forecasts: 23 · Brier: 0.248
The sample includes only resolved forecasts with a recorded probability. Interpretations and unresolved entries are excluded.
The high-yield and investment-grade credit spreads have widened to fresh 99.6th and 100th percentile extremes while the S&P 500 remains below its 20-session high and equity volatility reads calm in contango.
What would prove it wrong
The high-yield credit spread narrows back toward its pre-13 October range as the S&P 500 recovers to approach its 20-session high of 7811.54.
Read analysis#How it settled
VIX has moved to 20.83 (67th percentile) with the term structure flipping into backwardation, contradicting the original claim of calm, contango-reading equity volatility, even as the credit spread extremes and S&P 500 sub-high positioning remain intact.
The S&P 500's 1.47% decline on 30 October 2026 coincides with, but is not yet proven caused by, a high-yield credit spread remaining elevated, and the desk is watching whether equity weakness and credit stress move together or apart over the coming sessions.
What would prove it wrong
If the S&P 500 recovers to approach its 20-session high of 7818.93 while the high-yield credit spread narrows back toward its pre-13 October range, the reading that credit stress is now driving the equity move would be undermined.
Read analysis#How it settled
The S&P 500's 0.98% bounce so far on 2 November 2026 moves only one of the two legs the 30 October falsifier required; the high-yield spread's percentile (94.8 versus 98.8 on 27 October) has not narrowed meaningfully, so the reading that credit stress is still relevant to the equity move stands.
The high-yield credit spread sits at a 98.8th percentile extreme alongside a near-identical reading in investment-grade credit, while equity volatility remains in a calm contango regime and the S&P 500 trades near its 20-session high, a divergence the Fed's 28 October decision and the following day's Core PCE print will test.
What would prove it wrong
If the high-yield spread narrows back toward its pre-13 October range ahead of the Fed decision and Core PCE release, while jobless claims stay near current lows, the reading that credit is pricing index-level risk would be undermined.
Read analysis#How it settled
HY and IG spreads have moved from the 98.8th-percentile extreme cited on 27 Oct down to the 86.1st/90.9th percentiles (z=1.35/1.34), a genuine normalization rather than mere modest easing, and jobless claims at 194k (2nd percentile) remain near lows, together satisfying the falsifier's narrowing condition and undermining the original credit-stress framing.
The high-yield credit spread sits at the 99.2nd percentile of its year while jobless claims have fallen to 194,000, their lowest since July, and the Fed futures curve prices a firmer policy path over the next twelve months.
What would prove it wrong
If the high-yield credit spread narrows back toward its range prior to the 13 October acceleration while initial jobless claims remain near current lows, the credit-stress signal would have overstated the deterioration.
Read analysis#How it settled
The 22 October note's credit-stress read is sustained: the high-yield spread remains near its prior extreme (98.8th percentile versus 99.2nd previously) and jobless claims are unchanged at 194,000, so the tension the note flagged has neither resolved nor worsened materially.
Two tightening channels, a firming Fed-futures path and a high-yield credit spread near its yearly extreme, are converging on risk assets even as a resilient labor market argues the credit read may be overstating stress.
What would prove it wrong
If the high-yield credit spread stabilizes or narrows over the coming weeks while initial jobless claims remain near current lows, that would indicate the credit-stress reading was over-reading a transient widening rather than identifying a genuine deterioration in default risk.
Read analysis#How it settled
The 15 October falsifier required the high-yield spread to stabilize or narrow while claims stayed low; instead the spread has widened further to the 99.2nd percentile even as claims fell to 194,000, so the credit-stress reading is sustained, not undermined.
The rates market prices a firmer policy path while the regime system names credit stress, at the 81st percentile and climbing, as the dominant driver of market conditions.
What would prove it wrong
If the high-yield credit spread narrows back toward its range prior to 12 October while Treasury yields remain at current levels, the regime system's credit-stress framing would be contradicted, as the yield elevation would then be explained by factors other than deteriorating corporate credit conditions.
Read analysis#How it settled
the high-yield credit spread's velocity accelerated to 2.16 while the 10-year yield held at its 96th percentile, the opposite of the narrowing the 12 October falsifier required
Fed funds futures are pricing a firmer 12-month policy path (80bp higher, not cuts) well above the FOMC's own 2.8% committee mean, even as August job openings fell to 7.079 million and consumer confidence hit a 12-year low, leaving the front end of the Treasury curve exposed if the labor deterioration continues into the 2 October payrolls report.
What would prove it wrong
If the 2-year Treasury yield closes at or below 4.50% within the next 15 trading days, the priced tightening path this note describes will have reversed rather than persisted.
Read analysis#How it settled
no DGS2 close below 4.5 through 2026-10-21
Fed funds futures are pricing a firmer, higher policy path (71.5bp higher over 12 months, not cuts) running ahead of the FOMC's own 2.9% mean projection, driving a historically fast repricing at the front end of the Treasury curve even as the broader regime read stays balanced.
What would prove it wrong
If the 2-year Treasury yield retreats to 4.50% or lower by 27 September 2026, the fast repricing this note is built on will have proven supply-driven and reversible rather than a sustained repricing of rate expectations.
Read analysis#How it settled
DGS2 closed above 4.5 on 2026-09-24 (close 4.87)
An oil-driven inflation shock is colliding with a Treasury yield already at the 100th percentile of its year, while high-yield credit spreads at the 7.1st percentile still refuse to confirm the regime's stated credit-stress driver.
Read analysis#What would prove it wrong
If the 11 September CPI print shows core or headline inflation accelerating from the prior month's readings while high-yield spreads widen out of their current range, the premise that credit stress is disconnected from real-time inflation signals would be overturned.
The options market is pricing calm into a rates market pricing a firmer path and a Treasury yield at the 99.2nd percentile of its year, a positioning gap the 8 September note's credit-stress finding does not explain.
What would prove it wrong
If the VIX closes above 20 in the five sessions following the 11 September Core CPI y/y print, the options market has repriced its assessment of the rate-path risk it is currently underpricing.
Read analysis#How it settled
VIXCLS closed below 20 on 2026-09-10 (close 17.84)
The regime's stated credit-stress driver is not corroborated by high-yield spreads, VIX or financial conditions, all sitting near their year's lows; the genuine extreme is the Treasury supply and rate-path story, with the 10-year yield at the 99.2nd percentile of its own year.
What would prove it wrong
If credit stress materialises as an independent driver, high-yield spreads and financial conditions indices would break their year's lows in tandem with deteriorating economic data on CPI or labour prints, removing the Treasury supply explanation's centrality to the regime read.
Read analysis#How it settled
High-yield credit spreads remain at the 8.3rd percentile and the financial conditions index at the 4.8th percentile of their own year, both still nowhere near the extremes needed to corroborate the regime's stated credit-stress driver, so the 8 September reading that the Treasury supply and rate-path story is the genuine extreme still holds.
The 10-year Treasury yield's 99.2nd-percentile level already prices most of the current Treasury supply wave, even as the regime's stated credit-stress driver shows no corresponding extreme in high-yield spreads.
What would prove it wrong
If the 9 or 10 September Treasury auction (reopening) results require the 10-year yield to close above 4.95% to draw participation, and the yield holds above that level through the close of 17 September, the thesis that the supply story is already priced fails.
Read analysis#How it settled
DGS10 closed above 4.95 on 2026-09-10 (close 4.95)