Thesis ledger
Dated forecasts and market interpretations with assessment criteria and subsequent outcomes. This records research, not portfolio performance.
Publication range: 2 Jul 2026 – 10 Sept 2026. Source: Hawk Thorne research record. Thesis descriptions retain the content recorded in the ledger.
Forecasts
15Claims about future events, assessed against a stated condition and time horizon.
- Held
- 7
- Broke
- 6
- Unresolved
- 0
- Awaiting assessment
- 2
Interpretations
99Assessments of current conditions. New evidence can sustain, revise or retire an interpretation. These do not contribute to forecast accuracy.
- Sustained
- 4
- Revised
- 9
- Retired
- 7
- Awaiting assessment
- 50
- Historical assessments
- 29
Assessment rules and forecast calibration
Since 27 July 2026, forecasts and interpretations follow separate assessment rules. Earlier interpretations graded against price thresholds remain in the history and are excluded from calibration.
Declared probabilities compared with assessed outcomes. Brier is the mean squared error; a lower score indicates less error within this sample. A small sample does not establish future forecasting accuracy.
Forecast calibration
scored forecasts: 13 · Brier: 0.250
The sample includes only resolved forecasts with a recorded probability. Interpretations and unresolved entries are excluded.
The 2-year Treasury yield's stretch near the 99.6th percentile of its trailing year remains a fiscal-issuance story, not a war-risk premium, confirmed by its failure to fall even as WTI crude gave back 4.96% over five sessions on fading Iran escalation risk.
What would prove it wrong
If the 2-year Treasury yield falls meaningfully below 4.31% in the sessions following the 28-29 July Treasury auctions and the 29 July Fed decision, the fiscal-supply framing for the front end fails.
Read analysis#How it settled
DGS2 closed below 4.31 on 2026-07-29 (close 4.22)
Brent's spec book keeps adding to a net long into the falling tape while WTI's short has already covered, leaving Brent's crowd the one carrying the risk if the Iran pause holds and the premium keeps draining.
What would prove it wrong
If US-Iran strikes resume and the pause breaks, letting the risk premium reassert, or Brent crude climbs back above 100.69 within the horizon, the de-escalation unwind read fails and the asymmetry view retires.
Read analysis#How it settled
The 27 July note claimed both legs of its 22 July falsifier had landed, but the pack contains no 29 July Crude Oil Inventories figure to confirm the build-leg, only the prior report's -7.2M draw carried forward ahead of the 5 August release; only the WTI short-covering leg, visible in the 28 July COT report, can be confirmed from this pack.
WTI crude's 25.72% monthly rally is pricing a live Iran escalation risk that the rates market is not reflecting; the 2-year Treasury yield's 100th-percentile stretch is a fiscal supply story, not a war-risk repricing, and the two will not stay decoupled indefinitely.
What would prove it wrong
If the 2-year Treasury yield falls meaningfully below 4.31% in the sessions following the 27-28 July Treasury auctions even as WTI crude holds its gains, the fiscal-supply framing for the front end fails and a flight-to-quality bid becomes the better explanation.
Read analysis#How it settled
WTI has fallen 4.96% over 5 days (-2.31% on the day) on de-escalation/ceasefire signals, meaning the war-risk premium is unwinding rather than holding, so the original premise of a live decoupled Iran risk in oil is invalidated by the actual price action.
Polish bank equity faces a two-sided squeeze: a CIT and bank-tax burden already running at roughly 80% of 2025's full-year total after just six months, with talk of a further increase, converging with an NBP reference rate at 3.75% since 5 March 2026 that is compressing net interest margins from the other direction.
What would prove it wrong
If the discussed CIT increase fails to advance to a formal legislative draft in the coming weeks, or if the 30 July 2026 CPI flash print comes in meaningfully above the NBP's March projection path (already assuming inflation above the 3.5% upper band through end-2026) and forces a pause in further rate cuts, the margin side of the squeeze eases and the fiscal threat alone would need to prove out on its own to justify continued underperformance in WIG-BANKI.
Read analysis#How it settled
WIG-BANKI's 1.39% rally on 27 July directly reverses the underperformance thesis's premise of continued sector weakness, and the framing of Alior's write-down as a contained 'minor adjustment' undercuts the fiscal/margin squeeze narrative, even though the CPI flash falsifier itself has not yet triggered.
Poland's June unemployment fall to 5.8% supports the NBP's easing case on paper, but a five-point drop in workplace sentiment (CBOS, July) and an inflation path the NBP's own March projection already expects to be revised higher after the fuel-cap expiry mean the labour data alone should not be read as a green light for further cuts.
Read analysis#What would prove it wrong
If Poland CPI flash estimate (GUS) on 30 July comes in meaningfully above the NBP's March projection path (which already assumed CPI above the 3.5% upper band through end-2026), the softer unemployment print loses its weight in the easing debate; if it lands close to that path despite the fuel-cap expiry, the labour data's case for cutting is confirmed.
Fresh net Treasury issuance of $125.9bn against an $87.2bn TGA liquidity drain, combined with a live oil supply-risk shock pushing WTI crude to a 20-day high, is compounding rather than easing pressure on the front end, and the pending 23 July 10-year auction is the near-term test of whether the market can absorb it without a yield concession.
Read analysis#What would prove it wrong
If the 23 July 10-year Treasury auction clears with a strong bid-to-cover and no yield tail relative to the pre-auction market, the supply-and-drain framing is overstated and attention should focus elsewhere for what is holding yields up.
WTI crude's managed-money short grew into a 6.68% five-session rally to 93.6% of its three-year percentile range, a positioning mismatch that leaves the short side exposed to any further tightening or Hormuz escalation, while Brent's spec book, net long but being trimmed, is leaning the opposite way on the same risk.
What would prove it wrong
If the 22 July 2026 Crude Oil Inventories report shows a build rather than the forecast 2.0 million barrel draw, and the WTI managed-money short begins covering rather than extending in the following COT report, the offside-short read fails and the market's own positioning would confirm the rally has lost its supply-side justification.
Read analysis#How it settled
Both falsifier legs met: the 22 July 2026 EIA report showed a 2.0 million barrel build against the forecast 2.0 million barrel draw, and the COT report dated 21 July 2026 showed the managed-money short covering by 7,767 contracts to net short 8,557 rather than extending. By the note's own condition, the offside-short read fails.
WTI crude's 0.95% reversal to 81.71 on 20 July 2026 off a fresh 20-day-high approach, driven by a single-wire Iran cease-fire proposal against a single-wire 45-year-low supply cushion, sets a thin physical floor against a de-escalation headline; WTI crude managed-money short of 16,324 that grew 7,326 on the week (COT index 84.2, 3-year percentile 93.6) is offside into the rally and is the flow that would chase any unwind, while Brent crude's modest net long (12,938) makes the two grades an asymmetric, not single, Iran trade.
Read analysis#What would prove it wrong
If WTI crude resumes climbing toward fresh 20-day highs despite the cease-fire proposal, or if the 22 July Crude Oil Inventories report shows a further draw that keeps WTI supported inside a tight balance, the cease-fire-driven reversal read fails and the thin-cushion floor holds.
The Treasury curve is pricing two separate stories at once: the front end (2Y, 5Y, SOFR) is covering shorts on softening Canadian and US data, while the 10-year short extends to its most stretched since January on a fiscal-supply narrative the long end has not let go of.
Read analysis#What would prove it wrong
If the next COT report shows the 10-year note's short beginning to cover alongside the front end rather than extending further, the curve-split reading fails and a single delayed repricing becomes the more likely explanation.
This week's earnings reactions in Netflix, Intuitive Surgical, Regions Financial and SpaceX reflect four distinct mechanisms rather than a broadening earnings-quality problem, and the S&P e-mini's extending speculative short (unlike the covering seen in Nasdaq and Russell futures) marks a genuine split in positioning rather than confirmation of contagion.
What would prove it wrong
If the S&P 500 breaks below its 20-day low of 7354.02 or the Nasdaq Composite breaks below its 20-day low of 25297.62 on renewed selling tied to this week's earnings names, the mechanism-split read fails and a broader earnings-quality deterioration becomes the better story.
Read analysis#How it settled
^GSPC traded below 7354.02 on 2026-07-29 (session low 7313.92)
WTI's break to 80.06 on 17 July 2026, above the 20-day high of 79.34 within the 48-hour window, falsifies the desk's 15 July desensitization thesis; the Iran risk premium has snapped back to crude alone (Brent 86.02, both fresh 20-day highs) while gold (-7.35% m/m) and silver (-19.82% m/m) pull back, reversing the 14 July metals-hedge call, with a WTI managed-money short at its smallest of the year (COT index 99) leaving specs offside into rising prices.
What would prove it wrong
If WTI crude gives back its gains and falls back inside its prior 20-day range while gold and silver resume climbing, the premium-back-to-crude read fails and the 14 July metals-hedge framing is vindicated.
Read analysis#How it settled
no CL=F trade below 75 through 2026-08-01
Fading Fed cut expectations, an EXTREME fiscal gravity read (heavy net issuance against a TGA drawdown) and WTI crude at a fresh 20-day high above $80 are outvoting genuine eurozone and US disinflation data, so the rates path is being set by supply and energy, not the inflation trend.
What would prove it wrong
If the 2-year Treasury yield falls in the sessions following 17 July 2026 despite the EXTREME fiscal gravity read and WTI's fresh high, the supply-and-energy-dominant framing fails.
Read analysis#How it settled
no CL=F trade below 73 through 2026-08-01